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    近年来，投资者保护 作为热点问题在公司金融领域一直备受国内外学者的关
注，特别是在我国股票市场持续低迷不振的情况下，如何切实保护广大中小投
资者利益、保证我国股市的可持续发展是一个重要的理论和实践课题。 


































































    Recently, investor protection is becoming the focus in corporate finance, 
receiving great attentions from scholars both in and outside of China. Especially under 
the background that our stock markets have been bearish these years, it has been an 
important theoretical and practical subject to effectively protect the benefits of 
minority shareholders in order to ensure the sustainable development of the stock 
markets in China. 
This paper absorbs the previous research outcomes in corporate finance and 
studies the systematic mechanisms of outside investor protection from a three 
dimensional perspective of corporate finance, law and politics (government) aiming to 
find a solution to the self-realization of investor protection under the current financial 
ecological environment in China. 
This paper consists of four chapters. The first one is the summary of the literature 
of private benefits of control. It summarizes the qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics of private benefits of control and presents the existing research 
outcomes, which lays a foundation for the following chapters. The second one 
discusses the corporate ownership right, control right and investor protection. 
Ownership structure is of great significance to the self-realization mechanism of 
restricting the expropriation behavior. Beginning with the evolution of the research 
on corporate ownership structure in by scholars, we build a theoretical model to 
analyze the expropriation behavior by control owner under the pyramid control 
structure based on the study of control realization characteristics in the control owner 
mode and the empirical study of the pyramid control structure in China. Law 
construction, enforcement efficiency and investor protection fall into the third 
chapter. It studies the legal mechanism of investor protection from the perspective of 
law and finance and discusses the relationship among ownership structure, 
enforcement strength and investor protection through theoretical model and 
empirical analysis. The fourth one examines the relationship between government 
behavior and investor protection. As the law maker and executor, the government 
may expropriate outside investor’s benefits by intervening in firms with its power. 
While the ownership structure may influence the cost of government intervening. 














governance mechanism in investor protection from the perspective of new political 
economics, builds a theoretical model of double expropriation and conducts an 
empirical test with the data from the listed firms in China. 
Analysis on ownership structure is the main theme of the whole paper, guiding 
all the models and relevant empirical studies in studying the realization mechanism 
of outside investor protection. The innovations of this paper are: (1) absorbing the 
previous research outcomes in corporate finance in the analysis frame of investor 
protection highlighting the private benefits of control; (2) providing the 
self-realization mechanism of investor protection and studying the corporate 
governance mechanism(mainly the ownership structure) through the paper; (3) 
conducting a thorough theoretical analysis on the tunneling and propping behavior 
under the pyramid control structure; (4) conducting an empirical test on the 
reputation mechanism, corporate financial condition indicator( whether or not ST) 
and corporate ownership structure (ownership concentration of the top ten 
shareholders) in the analysis of the factors affecting the violation behaviors by listed 
firms in China; (5) bringing in the analysis of the expropriation behavior by 
government officials and building a double expropriation theoretical model 
supported by the empirical study with the data from China in investor protection 
analysis. 
The core research conclusion of this paper is that the appropriate ownership 
concentration by the biggest shareholder of the listed firms, with the incentives of 
cash flow rights, is not only beneficial to the realization of self-restraints of the 
control owner’s expropriation behavior, but also good for the restraints on the 
expropriation behaviors by government officials in the current financial ecological 
environment in China. Although the other big shareholders may resist the 
expropriation behaviors by government officials, their restrictive function on the 
control owner still needs to be strengthened. 
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